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Share of low-wage workers and distance between their average earnings and the 
low-wage threshold (less than 60% of the monthly equivalized* median wage) 
in the EU in 2009 
 
*corrected by the country specific part-time ratio (for methodological details see Fernández-Macías & Vacas-Soriano 2013: 20) 
Source: Fernández-Macías & Vacas-Soriano (2013), own presentation 
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Share of low wage earners in % 
 
distance of average wages of low wage 
earners to the low wage threshold in% 
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 1.1 „Why there will be no MW in Germany“  
-  “the age of dualisation’ in Europa (Emmenegger et al. 
2012) – split between segment of protected core workers 
and segment of precarious workers  
- Difference to other concepts, such as polarisation or 
marginalisation – encompasses not only the outcomes of 
dualisation but also the politics of change 
- Basic argument: dualisation of labour markets has been 
made possible only by the breakup of earlier solidaristic 
political alliances whose aim was to include all categories 
of employee.  
- Palier/Thelen 2010: Dualism = “a new (less egalitarian 
but possibly quite robust) equilibrium”   
 
 
 1.2 „Why there will be no MW in German!“  
Dualistic papers on Germany: 
- Palier/Thelen (2010): “‘The stronger unions are joined 
in their opposition to a statutory minimum wage by the 
main employers’ federations” 
- Carlin/Soskice (2009): ‘Works councils representing 
skilled workers had every interest in flexible low-level 
service labour demands”  
- Hassel 2014: “The capacity of service unions for  a 
NMW … is severely limited by the opposition of 
manufacturing unions” 
 
 
 2.1 Post-deterministic theories of institutional 
change 
 - Crouch/Farell (2002): institutional stability is, at best, a 
temporary phenomenon - pressure for change primarily in 
shifts in the power relations between central actors 
- Baccaro/Howell (2011): existing industrial relations 
institutions - less important than the ‘force field’ in which 
they operate, which shifts in the direction of deregulation 
- Well equipped to analyse the various forms of 
deregulation and incremental erosion of institutions. 
- Much less well equipped to analyse proactive or 
strenghtening of inclusive labour market institutions  
- therefore  neglect of proactive politics of change, 
probably because of few encouraging examples 
  
2.2 Post-deterministic theories of institutional 
changes: Theoretical framework for renew ing union 
capacity helpful  
Source: Lévesque / Murray (2010): Understanding union power: resources and capabilities for renewing union capacity. In: Transfer: European 
Review of Labour and Research 16 (3), p. 346 
 
 
3.1 Has there been a stable dualistic equilibrium in DE?  
Outcomes: segments not stable – low wage sector has 
strong pull effects:  creates incentives for employers to 
outsource jobs and renegotiate standards of core 
workers: decreasing coverage by CA , increase of low  
wage sector, shrink ing middle class 
 
Politics of change: direct politic attacks also on core 
workers: product market  deregulation, privatization, 
deregulation of temp agency work to allow  for 
substitution of core workers, political pressure on 
manufacturing unions to accept opening clauses) 
 
Palier/Thelen, Hassel, Carlin/Soskice ignore these pull 
effects and political pressures on core workers 
/sources of instability     
3.2 Coverage by collective agreements in % of employees 
Source: WSI – Tarifarchiv (IAB Betriebspanel) 
 
3.3. Increase of low wages: Distribution of hourly 
pay, Germany, adjusted for inflation (base = 1995) 
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4.1 The campaign for the MW  
MW not a „planned child“ – borne out of necessity 
-  „Learning“ proved to be most difficult 
- Unions had to accept and admit that they lost the power to 
negotiate CA in important segments of the LM 
-  NGG (food processing, hotels, restaurants) and ver.di 
(services) most affected / had to learn first – at beginning 
strong resistance of manufacturing unions 
- New “narrative resources” on increasing inequality 
developed  
- Successful “framing”  of the proposal of a MW as an 
important part of a wider social project to fight inequality and 
poverty 
- Embedded in political networks: political parties, charity 
organizations, churches ... 
 
4.2 The campaign for the MW  
- Internal solidarity:  because of experience with outsourcing 
and the help of left wing social democrats („intermediation“) 
manufacturing unions agreed tu support the demand for a 
MW in 2006 
- Experimenting and learning:  Support of path-dependent 
negotiated Industry Speficic MW - materialised only ‘in dribs 
and drabs’ without reducing the share of low-wage workers in 
the economy – therefore active campaigning of all unions for a 
MW in 2014 
-Demand for path-dependent MW  linked with CB 
(“articulation”) 
 
 
 
 
5.1 The new NMW 
- Strong union impact on coalition negotiations 
between SPD and CDU/CSU in 2014  
-  Goal: MW as path dependent as possible –links with 
CB and re-regulation of temp agency work 
- MW part of a „Law to strengthen autonomous 
collective bargaining“ which includes 
-  the „Minimum wage law“  
-  facilitation  of the extension of CA („public interest“) 
-  negotiations of I-MW‘s in all industries possible 
-Separate law for re-regulation of temp agency work 
now prepared  (controversial) 
 
5.2 The new NMW 
Strong influence of social partners on MW: 
-„Minimum Wage Commission “ (MWC) formed according 
the proposals of the social partners 
-9 members (3 from employers/ 3 from unions, social partners 
proposed each one academic and jointly a chairperson)  
- the two academics in the commission have no right to vote 
- evaluation and binding recommendations for increases   
- increases should follow average increases of collectively 
agreed wages 
- Statistical Office developed an indicator for these increases 
- MWC agreed unanimously on an internal regulation that 
deviation from the index only possible with 2/3 of the vote 
Social partners agree that CB sets the pace for increases in the 
minimum wage 
 
Employment and working hours 2008 - 2016 
Source: IMK-Report 04/2015  
 
Conclusions 
- Increase of low wage  work - the breeding ground for 
active resistance  
- Dynamics of the low wage sector blurred dividing 
lines between the interests of insiders and outsiders  
- New narrative on inequality created link between 
demand for a NM and manufacturing unions’ drive for 
a re-regulation of temp agency work and the 
prevention of outsourcing 
- The power resources of the manufacturing unions 
crucial in campaign 
 
 
Conclusions 
Conditions for a social reform project, as defined by 
Lévesque and Murray (2010), were developed in a 
learning process in networks  
McAdam et al. (2001):  caution against focusing only on 
individual groups of actors with their specific 
constellations of interests when analysing social 
movements pressing for social reform 
 
“It is easy to be wise after the event” -  but analysis of 
the flaws in dualistic theories important for 
understanding the making  of the German MW and 
other successful campaigns   
 
 
  
 
  
